"Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties, Identity, and Pregnancy"
Maja Sidzinska
Abstract
Is pregnancy an intrinsic property of mammals—conceived of as a sortal property,1 which includes persons, or is it an extrinsic property— a relation between mammals? When we say of a subject that it is pregnant, what truthmaker or ontological ground is suggested—one that includes one or two particulars?2 Answering these questions may push us toward certain answers about the nature of numerical identity or about the nature of qualitative identity, or about their relationship (or lack thereof).
In this paper, I argue that pregnancy is neither properly conceived of as an intrinsic property nor properly conceived of as an extrinsic property. This is because, biologically, the gestative and fetal entities cannot be said to be either one thing or two things. Physiologically, the gestative and fetal entities are integrated in some senses but not others. But traditional metaphysics deals in discrete referents and is thus exclusive of pregnant organisms. In this way, it is masculinist.
Traditional metaphysics would force pregnancy into one camp or the other; it would force dualistic thinking about pregnancy. Biological facts about pregnancy foreclose the plausibility of this dialectic, and may therefore suggest a way toward feminist foundational metaphysics.
Is pregnancy an intrinsic property of mammals—conceived of as a sortal property,1 which includes persons, or is it an extrinsic property— a relation between mammals? When we say of a subject that it is pregnant, what truthmaker or ontological ground is suggested—one that includes one or two particulars?2 Answering these questions may push us toward certain answers about the nature of numerical identity or about the nature of qualitative identity, or about their relationship (or lack thereof).
In this paper, I argue that pregnancy is neither properly conceived of as an intrinsic property nor properly conceived of as an extrinsic property. This is because, biologically, the gestative and fetal entities cannot be said to be either one thing or two things. Physiologically, the gestative and fetal entities are integrated in some senses but not others. But traditional metaphysics deals in discrete referents and is thus exclusive of pregnant organisms. In this way, it is masculinist.
Traditional metaphysics would force pregnancy into one camp or the other; it would force dualistic thinking about pregnancy. Biological facts about pregnancy foreclose the plausibility of this dialectic, and may therefore suggest a way toward feminist foundational metaphysics.